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Abstract. Can choice of mutualistic partners and the degree of their utilization determine
(1) mutualistic partner coexistence, (2) relative abundance of mutualistic partners, and (3)
environment-dependent changes in relative abundance? We investigate these questions in the
context of the plant–mycorrhizal fungal mutualism by building a biological market model
potentially applicable to other mutualisms as well. We examine the situation where a single
plant selectively utilizes member(s) of a group of ectomycorrhizal potential trading partners.
Under biologically realistic circumstances, the plant may simultaneously utilize multiple
partners, its degree of utilization determining the community structure of the fungi. If
utilization of multiple partners is optimal, the marginal cost of acquiring additional nitrogen
from every trading partner must be equal while the marginal cost of acquiring it from any
unutilized partner must be larger. Because the plant’s nitrogen demand is light dependent, the
composition of the fungal species among its trading partners changes along light-availability
gradients. We discuss the design of an experiment to test the key prediction of our model, the
equalization of marginal cost.
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INTRODUCTION
Mutualisms are ubiquitous in nature (Janzen 1985),
with a significant portion of mutualistic interactions
involving associations with multi-species mutualistic
partner communities (reviewed by Stanton 2003). For
example, a single plant is commonly associated with
several species of mycorrhizal fungal partners (Smith
and Read 1997). There are two unique attributes of these
partner communities. First, the quality of the partners in
the mutualistic partner communities is documented to
vary from good mutualists, to mediocre mutualists, to
cheaters that appear to provide nothing in return for the
rewards they reap (Stanton 2003). Second, in addition to
potential direct partner–partner interactions, the mu-
tualistic partners interact with one another indirectly
through their direct interactions with the shared host
mutualist. Thus, the host, through its morphological,
physiological, and behavioral responses to the partners,
can potentially play a key role in regulating the partner
community. These responses of the host can lead to
favoring or ‘‘choosing’’ certain partners over others. The
goal of this paper is to examine the potential role of this
‘‘partner choice’’ in mediating partner coexistence,
determining relative abundances of partners, and shift-
ing relative abundances of partners with shifting
resources—in a system marked by an ecologically
significant variation of partner quality.
The concept of partner choice was applied to the
study of mutualisms already by Darwin (1859, in Sachs
et al. 2004) in his explanation of the evolution of
nectaries. Since then partner choice gained popularity in
the literature on both interspecific and intraspecific
cooperation (see the review by Sachs et al. 2004); early
examples include mate choice (Dawkins 1976), the tit-
for-tat strategy of the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, the
evolutionary stability of tit-for-tat, and establishment of
tit-for-tat in a defector population (Axelrod and
Hamilton 1981, Eshel and Cavallisforza 1982). Empiri-
cal observation of baboon interactions led Noe¨ (1990) to
take partner choice out of the iterative framework, and
Bull and Rice (1991) proposed that partner choice alone
could lead to the evolution and maintenance of
mutualism—an idea that is currently receiving both
empirical and theoretical attention (Denison 2000, Kiers
et al. 2003). The verbal theory of biological markets
(Noe¨ and Hammerstein 1994) expanded the concept of
partner choice from a dichotomous decision to the
choice of the extent of partner utilization—an idea
central to our paper.
To operate, partner choice requires variation in
partner quality, assessment of partner quality by the
host, and a decision rule to determine which partners to
associate with, and on the degree of association with
each chosen partner (West et al. 2002). The decision rule
also involves morphological, physiological, or behav-
ioral mechanism that encourages the association of the
host with partners contributing to greater reproductive
success and association of the host with low-quality
partners (Sachs et al. 2004). This flexible strategy leads
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to the choice of more beneficial individual partners.
However, if the interspecific variation in costs and
benefits associated with individual partners is greater
than the intraspecific variation, then this choice of
individuals necessarily leads to consistent and predict-
able choice of more beneficial species of partner
mutualists. Over evolutionary time the hosts may evolve
fixed preferences for or against certain species of
partners, and thus replace the assessment-decision rule
system with a partner-species-recognition system.
Partner choice is likely to be a common phenomenon
in nature. In a recent review of the game-theoretical
structure of mutualistic systems, Bshary and Bronstein
(2004) examined the potential for partner choice across
different mutualisms and concluded that with the
exception of vertically transmitted mutualisms, all other
classes of mutualisms exhibited the potential features of
partner choice. Well-documented cases of partner choice
include pollination syndromes of plants (Bshary and
Bronstein 2004), choice of plant species by pollinators
(Bshary and Bronstein 2004), choice of aphid species by
ants (Fischer et al. 2001), choice of luminescent bacteria
strains by squids (Visick et al. 2000 in Sachs et al. 2004),
and sanctions of legumes against cheating Rhizobia
(Denison et al. 2003, Kiers et al. 2003). Selective carbon
allocation by plants toward better performing mycor-
rhizal fungi is currently under investigation (J. D. Bever,
personal communication).
The degree to which partner choice determines
partner species coexistence and relative abundance of
partner species is largely unknown. In some systems
partner choice is not necessary for partner species
coexistence—as shown by coexistence of a superior
mutualistic partner and an inferior mutualistic partner
(or a cheater) in models of Bronstein et al. (2003), and
Ferriere et al. (2002), none of which includes partner
choice. However, in other systems, such as the model of
Hoeksema and Kummel 2003, partner choice is neces-
sary for partner coexistence. Currently, there is growing
empirical interest in the role that partner choice plays in
shaping partner population and community dynamics.
For example the choice of a more desirable aphid species
draws ant protection away from the less desirable aphid
species which, as a result, experience a higher level of
predation and population decline (Fischer et al. 2001).
Partner choice is likely to be an important driving force
in systems that resemble biological markets (Noe¨ and
Hammerstein 1994). Mutualisms are based on a
mutually beneficial exchange of resources or services
(Bronstein 1994). However, specific conditions have to
be met for this exchange to resemble trading within a
biological market. These conditions include exchange of
commodities, choice of trading partners, and competi-
tion via outbidding (Noe¨ and Hammerstein 1994).
Clearly, not all mutualistic systems fit this description.
However, in the systems that do satisfy the assumptions
of biological markets, the use of economic analogy and
the tools of economic analysis is fully appropriate.
The goal of this paper is to provide the first formal
mathematical model of the role of biological markets in
structuring communities of mutualistic partners associ-
ated with individual host mutualists. We investigate the
following questions: Can partner choice, via differential
partner utilization, lead to coexistence of several
mutualistic partners on a single host? Can partner
choice determine community structure of the mutualistic
partners, and can it explain changes in that community
structure in response to changing resource availability to
the host?
To address these questions, we build a model where
the growth of a host mutualist is dependent on the
resources it has available after trading with its diverse
mutualistic partners. Each potential partner is repre-
sented by its exchange function, which relates the
amount of resource 1 that the host must relinquish as
a payment for any given amount of resource 2 delivered
by that partner (e.g., how much carbon a plant needs to
relinquish in exchange for any given amount of nutrient
delivered by a mycorrhizal fungus). The host mutualist
selects the extent of use of its potential trading partners
to maximize its growth.
We assume that the host and partner mutualists
engage in an exchange of resources, that the same sets of
resources are exchanged between the host mutualist and
each of the partners, that the amount of resource 1
acquired per unit of resource 2 relinquished (the ‘‘price’’)
may vary among the partners, and that the host
mutualist can adjust the degree of utilization of its
partners. We initially assume that the partner mutualists
do not interact with one another but we subsequently
relax this simplification.
THE BIOLOGICAL SYSTEM
Our investigation focuses on symbiotic mutualistic
systems where one host mutualist simultaneously
interacts with several partner mutualists although it
can be generalized easily to the case where there are
multiple host mutualists (unpublished analysis available
from the authors). Biological examples include plants
interacting with several mycorrhizal fungi (Smith and
Read 1997), legumes hosting several genotypes of
nitrogen-fixing bacteria (Denison 2000), and corals
hosting several genotypes of zoozentele (Knowlton and
Rohwer 2003). Our model could be illustrated by any
symbiotic mutualism that conforms to the biological
markets assumptions (Noe¨ and Hammerstein 1994);
however, for concreteness we developed the model in the
context of the mutualism between plants and ectomy-
corrhizal fungi. The central feature of this mutualism is
an exchange of carbon assimilated by the plant for
nutrients (chiefly nitrogen) taken up by the fungi from
the soil (Smith and Read 1997). Individual plants
simultaneously associate with several species of ectomy-
corrhizal fungi (5–15 species of fungi commonly
associate with individual balsam fir seedlings, [M.
Kummel, personal observation]), and ectomycorrhizal
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fungi vary in their carbon for nutrient exchange rates
(Jones et al. 1998). Plants are likely to have the capacity
to choose the composition of ectomycorrhizal partners
through either selective root turnover or through
selective allocation of carbon to roots harboring more
effective species of fungi (Janos 1985).
THE MODEL
Consider a plant of unit size, which maximizes its
aboveground rate of growth. To grow, the plant requires
both C and N in the fixed ratio h, which reflects the C
and N stoichiometry of building new tissues. We
represent the plant’s growth requirements by a ray from
the origin in C–N space with positive slope h (Fig. 1a).
Points further out along the ray generate faster growth.
We refer to this ray, which plays an important role in
our analysis, as the ‘‘stoichiometric ray.’’
The plant assimilates carbon in photosynthesis and
uses some portion to purchase nitrogen from associated
mycorrhizal fungi. We assume that if the plant
relinquishes more carbon to a given fungus, it always
receives more nitrogen in exchange. The plant is
endowed with Cmax units of carbon (its photosynthetic
potential). A portion of this carbon (CN) is traded to the
mycorrhizal fungi in exchange for nitrogen while the
remainder (CG) is retained for growth: Cmax¼CGþCN.
In exchange for its aggregate payment of CN units of
carbon to the ectomycorrhizal fungi, the plant receives
in aggregate NG units of nitrogen.
To maximize growth , the plant relinquishes as little
carbon (CN) as possible in exchange for any given
amount of nitrogen. How much carbon the plant
relinquishes depends on (1) the mycorrhizal fungi
selected by the plant and (2) the intensity with which it
utilizes each fungus.
How a plant utilizes multiple partners to maximize growth
We will assume that each species of mycorrhizal
fungus is endowed with its own exchange function, CNf¼
rf (Nf), which we treat as given. Fungus f (for f¼1, . . ., F )
FIG. 1. (a) The stoichiometric ray and (b) the trading possibility boundary. The total nitrogen acquired and total carbon
remaining is represented by the two coordinates of the point of intersection of the ray and the boundary. CG represents the amount
of carbon retained for growth, NG represents the amount of nitrogen retained for growth, and Cmax is the plant’s total units of
carbon (its photosynthetic potential. An increase in the light level from (c) low to (d) high shifts every point on the trade possibility
boundary up vertically by Chighmax  Clowmax (where Clowmax is the photosynthetic potential at low light and Chighmax is the photosynthetic
potential at high light) and consequently results in a new intersection point farther out along the ray. In the low-light case (c) the
plant uses fungi F1 and F2; in the high-light case (d), the plant acquires more nitrogen not only by utilizing F1 and F2 more
intensively, but also by adding F3 as a third trading partner.
MIROSLAV KUMMEL AND STEPHEN W. SALANT894 Ecology, Vol. 87, No. 4
requires rf (Nf) units of carbon in order to provide Nf
units of nitrogen. We assume that the plant relinquishes
carbon if and only if it receives nitrogen in return and to
acquire more nitrogen it must relinquish more carbon.
Hence, we assume each exchange function passes
through the origin and is increasing. To permit the use
of calculus, we also assume each exchange function is
twice differentiable for Nf . 0. For each aggregate
amount of nitrogen acquired (NG), the plant is assumed
to utilize the available fungi to minimize its aggregate
carbon ‘‘payment.’’ Denote this minimized payment as
H(NG). Formally,
HðNGÞ ¼ min
Nff g
XF
f¼1
rf ðNf Þ
subject to
XF
f¼1
Nf ¼ NG
and
Nf  0 for f ¼ 1; . . . ;F:
After paying for the nitrogen acquired in the cheapest
way, the plant retains CG ¼ Cmax  H(NG) units of
carbon. We refer to this decreasing function, which plays
a leading role in our analysis, as the trading possibility
boundary (Fig. 1b). The carbon retained after payment,
when combined with the nitrogen acquired from the
trading partners, determines the plant’s growth. The
aggregate nitrogen acquisition that maximizes the
plant’s growth is determined graphically as the horizon-
tal component of the point of intersection of the
stoichiometric ray and the trading possibility boundary
(Fig. 1c and 1d).
The curvature of the exchange functions available to
the plant determines whether the plant has a single
trading partner or several trading partners. It also
determines the curvature of the trading possibility
boundary. We begin with the case where there are only
two fungi of different species (F ¼ 2) available to the
plant. This case is simplest and is used as a building
block in the more general case we discuss, where F  2.
To acquire NG units of nitrogen at lowest cost from
two species of fungus, the plant minimizes the following
function of one variable: g(N1) [ r1(N1)þ r2(NG N1),
whereN1 2 [0,NG]. If the global minimum occurs atN1 ¼
0, the plant utilizes only fungus 2 and g0(0)  0; for if
g0(0) , 0, more reliance on fungus 1 would reduce costs.
If the global minimum occurs at N1 ¼ NG, the plant
utilizes only fungus 1 and g0(NG)  0; for if g0(NG) . 0,
less reliance on fungus 1 would reduce costs. If the plant
utilizes both fungi simultaneously, then N1 2 (0, NG) and
the standard results from introductory calculus imply
that the following pair of conditions must hold:
g 0ðN1Þ[ r 01ðN1Þ  r 02ðNG  N1Þ ¼ 0 ð1Þ
g 00ðN1Þ[ r 001ðN1Þ þ r 002ðNG  N1Þ  0: ð2Þ
Following the short-hand terminology in economics,
we refer to the additional cost of acquiring another unit
of nitrogen from fungus f when that fungus is providing
Nf units of nitrogen (the first derivative r
0
f (Nf)) as the
‘‘marginal cost.’’ Condition 1 says that whenever the
plant utilizes both fungi simultaneously, their marginal
costs must be equal. We refer to the value of marginal
cost that is equalized among the fungal trading partners
(r 01(N1)¼ r 02(NG N1)) as the ‘‘common marginal cost.’’
Condition 2 says that if the plant utilizes both fungi,
the sum of the slopes of the two marginal-cost functions
cannot be negative. For suppose the two marginal costs
are equal but r 001 (N1)¼ r 002 (NG N1) , 0. This inequality
requires, of course, that at least one of the two exchange
functions is concave (r 00f (Nf), 0). Then since g
00(N1), 0,
carbon costs would be at a relative maximum and, while
no local variation in N1 could yield a first-order
reduction in the carbon payment, non-local variations
in N1 in either direction would reduce costs.
Exchange functions of differing shapes
and their consequences
It is useful to consider how carbon payments would be
minimized if every exchange function available is
concave or linear (r 00 , 0 or r 00 ¼ 0, respectively) on
the one hand or convex (r 00 . 0) on the other. This will
facilitate understanding the more general case where a
mixture of exchange functions of these three shapes is
available to the plant.
Concave and linear exchange functions (r 00  0).—
Suppose the plant has available two distinct species of
fungi, each with a different linear or concave (r 00  0)
exchange function. Then to obtain NG units of nitrogen,
the plant will trade with only one of the fungi. For, if it
were optimal to obtain nitrogen from both of them
simultaneously, condition 1 and 2 of the previous
subsection must hold and this is impossible: if the two
fungi have distinct linear exchange functions, then one
fungus provides nitrogen at a lower marginal cost than
the other and condition 1 cannot be satisfied; if instead
one fungus has a concave exchange function and the
other has a linear or concave function, then even if both
fungi provide nitrogen at the same marginal cost, the
sum of the second derivatives of their exchange
functions is negative and condition 2 is violated.
To obtain a given amount of nitrogen from two fungi
with linear or concave exchange functions, therefore, the
plant will rely on only one of them at a time. But the
plant may switch allegiance from one fungus to the other
if it needs a different amount of nitrogen. In Fig. 2a, the
linear exchange function is below the concave function
to the left of the intersection point and above it to the
right. The plant, therefore, uses the fungus with the
linear exchange function when the plant’s nitrogen needs
are low but switches to the fungus with the concave
exchange function when its nitrogen needs are high. In
Fig. 2b, each fungus has a concave exchange function
and they intersect twice. In this case, as its nitrogen
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needs increase, the plant switches from one fungus to the
other at the first intersection point but returns to the
original fungus beyond the second intersection point.
Notice that in each of these examples, the minimum
carbon payment for any nitrogen need, X, is simply the
lower envelope of the two exchange functions. Denote
this minimum payment as Hv(X ). Like the exchange
functions which make up each segment, this lower
envelope Hv(X ) is increasing and either linear or
concave. However, whenever the plant switches to a
different fungus, the lower envelope may be kinked. At
each kink, the right derivative is smaller than the left
derivative (but positive) because the exchange function
of the replacement trading partner is below that of the
fungus which is being displaced. Hence, Hv(X ) is weakly
concave (concave or linear) throughout.
All of these properties generalize if there are many
fungi with linear or concave exchange functions. The
plant never uses more than one of them at a time. The
carbon cost of obtaining X units of nitrogen in the
cheapest way is again, therefore, the lower envelope of
the exchange functions and this envelope (Hv(X )) is
increasing, may be kinked at switch points, and weakly
concave throughout.
The carbon available for growth after paying Hv(X )
out of the photosynthetic potential (Cmax) is simply CG
¼ Cmax  Hv(X ). Given the properties of Hv(X ), this
‘‘trading possibility boundary’’ is downward sloping,
weakly convex, and may be kinked.
Convex exchange functions (r 00 . 0).—Suppose instead
the plant has available two distinct exchange functions
that are convex. This shape raises the possibility that
coexistence condition 1 is satisfied and ensures that the
sum of second derivatives is strictly positive, satisfying
coexistence condition 2. Let fungus 1 0s exchange
function have the smaller marginal cost at the origin
(r 01(0) , r
0
2(0)). Then, if its nitrogen needs are low, the
plant may rely entirely on fungus 1. As its nitrogen needs
increase, the plant will rely more intensively on fungus 1
and, since its exchange function is convex, its marginal
cost will increase. Eventually a threshold (Xˆ ) is reached
where r 01(Xˆ )¼ r 02(0). If more than Xˆ units of nitrogen are
needed, the plant must then take on fungus 2 as an
additional trading partner in order to minimize costs.
Since the plant is then utilizing two sources at the same
time, the plant must acquire nitrogen from each source
so that the marginal costs are equal. As the plant
acquires more nitrogen in aggregate, the common
FIG. 2. Only one fungus from a set of available fungi will be utilized if all have linear or concave exchange functions as in panels
(a) and (b). The smallest carbon payment needed to acquire any specified amount of nitrogen will be given by the lower envelope of
the exchange functions (the heavy line). Although (a) and (b) depict cases with two linear or concave exchange functions, the same
results hold with any number of functions with this curvature. Panels (c) and (d) depict cases with one strictly convex exchange
function and the other weakly concave. In such cases, the plant may utilize both partners (at equal marginal cost) and, in brighter
light, would rely more on the concave fungus. Fig. 3 treats the case where all exchange functions are instead convex. A final case
occurs when some functions are convex and the others are linear or concave. To derive the trading possibility boundary in this case,
first construct the lower envelope of all the linear or concave exchange functions as in Fig. 2, panels (a) and (b), and then use this
single weakly concave ‘‘pseudo exchange function’’ (the lower envelope) along with the set of convex exchange functions in the
procedure in Fig. 3.
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marginal cost rises and each trading partner is used
more intensively. Denote the minimized cost of obtain-
ing X units of nitrogen from the convex exchange
functions as Hc(X ). There is zero cost if no nitrogen is
obtained and higher cost if more is obtained. Hence,
Hc(X ) is increasing and passes through the origin. When
the nitrogen demand is low, fungus 1 is relied upon
exclusively and Hc(X ) is convex since it coincides with
r1(X ). After fungus 2 becomes a trading partner, if the
plant needs additional nitrogen it must exploit each
partner more intensively so that the marginal costs
remain equalized and this raises their common value.
Since the slope of Hc(X ) at any point where there are
multiple trading partners is equal to the common
marginal cost underlying that point, Hc(X ) is convex.
At the point Xˆ where the plant’s nitrogen needs are just
sufficient to bring in the second fungus, the additional
cost of acquiring slightly more nitrogen is r 01(Xˆ ) and the
cost saving of acquiring slightly less nitrogen is also
r 01(Xˆ). Hence, there can be no kink at Xˆ. Hc(X ) is
increasing, smooth, and convex throughout.
All of this generalizes easily if the plant has available
any number of fungi with convex exchange functions. In
that case, the plant may rely on one fungus or on
several. If several, the plant obtains nitrogen from each
of its trading partners in such a way that the marginal
costs are equated (as condition 1 requires). If the plant
obtains more nitrogen in aggregate, the common
marginal cost will increase and each pre-existing trading
partner will provide more nitrogen. If costs are
minimized, any available fungus with r 0f (0) smaller than
this common marginal cost must be included as a
trading partner. When all the fungi available to the plant
have convex exchange functions, each fungus has ‘‘job
security’’: once the plant accepts it as a trading partner,
it will never get ‘‘laid off’’ or even utilized less intensively
as long as the plant’s nitrogen needs increase. A
graphical technique for predicting which fungi from a
set with convex exchange functions will be included as
trading partners and how intensively each will be utilized
in order to acquire any specified aggregate amount of
nitrogen is provided in Fig. 3.
Once again, the carbon available for growth after
paying Hc(X ) to obtain X units of nitrogen is simply CG
¼ Cmax  Hc(X ). Given the properties of Hc(X ), this
trading possibility boundary is downward sloping,
concave, and smooth.
Mixtures of convex (r 00 . 0) and linear (r 00 ¼ 0) or
concave (r 00 , 0) exchange functions.—Suppose instead
the plant has available two distinct species of fungi:
fungus 1 with a convex exchange function and fungus 2
with a linear or concave exchange function. As before,
each exchange function is assumed to pass through the
origin and to be smooth and increasing (r0 . 0). If r 01(0)
 r 02(0), the plant never uses fungus 1. But suppose r 01(0)
, r 02(0) as in Fig. 2c and 2d. Then the plant relies
exclusively on fungus 1 for small amounts of nitrogen.
But as the plant needs more nitrogen, fungus 1 provides
it on increasingly unfavorable terms. At some point,
fungus 2 will look attractive as an additional trading
partner. This happens at the threshold where the plant
must acquire X˜ units of nitrogen in aggregate, where
r1(X˜) ¼ r 02(0). If the plant needs more than X˜ units of
nitrogen, it includes fungus 2 as a trading partner. Since
it then is using two sources simultaneously, the two
marginal costs must have a common value. There are
two cases to consider, illustrated in Fig. 2.
In the first case (Fig. 2c), the exchange function of
fungus 2 is linear. Then for aggregate nitrogen
acquisition to increase while at the same time the two
marginal costs remain equal, the plant must obtain all of
the additional nitrogen from the linear exchange
function of fungus 2 and must not alter its acquisition
from the convex exchange function of fungus 1. In this
case, the common marginal cost at the two sources
remains equal to the constant slope of the linear
exchange function.
In the second case (Fig. 2d), the exchange function of
fungus 2 is concave. If the plant’s nitrogen needs (NG)
are increased and it continues to utilize both fungi, then
conditions 1 and 2 must continue to hold. Since drawing
more nitrogen from fungus 1 raises its marginal cost
while acquiring more from fungus 2 lowers its marginal
cost, the plant must increase its acquisition of nitrogen
from one fungus while reducing its acquisition from the
other in order to maintain the equality of the marginal
costs (condition 1). But which fungus does the plant rely
on more heavily for the additional nitrogen? Condition 2
requires that if the plant needs more nitrogen, it relies
increasingly on the fungus with the concave exchange
function and reduces (although to a lesser extent) its
utilization of the fungus with the convex exchange
function, thereby reducing the common marginal cost.
This result makes intuitive sense: when the plant needs
more nitrogen, it relies more heavily on the fungus which
gives it ‘‘discounts’’ (r 002 (N2), 0) on additional quantities
and less on the fungus which gives it ‘‘surcharges’’
(r 001 (N2) . 0) for additional quantities.
All of this generalizes easily if the plant has available
any number of exchange functions some of which are
convex and the remainder are linear or concave. We
continue to assume that all exchange functions are
smooth, increasing and pass through the origin. In this
more general case, what would the plant do to minimize
the cost of obtaining NG units of nitrogen? Denote as X
2 [0, NG] the nitrogen the plant obtains from the set of
convex fungi and NG X as the nitrogen it obtains from
the set of linear or concave fungi. Whatever nitrogen the
plant obtains from each group must be acquired in the
cheapest way if carbon costs are to be minimized. To
obtain any amount of nitrogen from the set of linear or
concave fungi in the cheapest way, the plant will rely
entirely on one fungus. To obtain any amount of
nitrogen from the set of fungi with convex exchange
functions (‘‘convex fungi’’), the plant will utilize one or
more of them. If it obtains X 2 [0, NG] units of nitrogen
April 2006 897THE ECONOMICS OF MUTUALISMS
from the convex fungi and the remainder from the linear
or concave fungi, the carbon cost will be Hc(X ) þ
Hv(NG  X ). To maximize the plant’s growth, X should
be chosen to minimize this cost. Denote the minimized
cost as H(NG), where
HðNGÞ ¼ min
X2½0;NG
HcðXÞ þ HvðNG  XÞ:
This minimized carbon payment is zero if no nitrogen
is acquired and increases as more nitrogen is acquired. If
it is advantageous for the plant to obtain even the first
unit of nitrogen from a linear or concave fungus, then all
subsequent units will also come from some linear or
concave fungi. However, if the first unit of nitrogen
comes from a convex fungus or a group of convex fungi,
then if nitrogen needs are sufficiently large, a threshold
may be reached where a single linear or concave fungus
is included in the set of trading partners along with these
convex fungi. If more nitrogen is then required and the
new fungus is linear, the plant would hold its utilization
of the convex fungi constant and increase its utilization
of the linear fungus. If the new fungus is concave, then
the plant would scale down its utilization of the convex
fungi (perhaps dumping a few) as it is increasing the
utilization of the concave fungus. In either case, as the
nitrogen demand increases new thresholds might be
crossed beyond which the plant replaces the lone linear
or concave fungus among its trading partners with a
different lone linear or concave fungus.
Given the properties of H(NG), the trading possibility
boundary is downward sloping, smooth, and concave as
long as every trading partner has a convex exchange
function. In ranges where a lone concave or linear
exchange function is also utilized, the trading possibility
boundary may be kinked with each segment linear if the
lone exchange function utilized in that range is linear
and convex otherwise.
Theory and preliminary evidence about the curvature
of fungal exchange functions
Because our model may be applicable to other
mutualisms with exchange functions of various shapes,
we have explored in some depth the consequences of
alternative curvature assumptions. However, theoretical
FIG. 3. (a) Three exchange functions and (b) the associated marginal-cost curves. To determine the minimal carbon payment
needed to obtain a specified NG, adjust the horizontal common marginal-cost line in panel (b) until the horizontal distance between
the vertical axis and the point where each marginal-cost curve intersects the common marginal-cost line (measuring the nitrogen
acquired from each fungus) adds up to the specified NG. Panel (c) shows how to determine the carbon payment to each fungus while
(d) associates the specified horizontal component NG with the computed vertical component CG to produce one point on the trade
possibility boundary. Repeating this procedure with different NG sweeps out the entire boundary. This procedure can be used for
any number of convex exchange functions and can be easily modified as described in The model: Extensions if some are linear or
concave. Nf is the optimal amount of nitrogen acquired from fungus f (i.e., N1 is the optimal amount of nitrogen acquired from
fungus 1); Cf is the payment of carbon the plant has to make to fungus f for acquiring Nf units of nitrogen.
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arguments suggest that in the case of fungi, the exchange
functions are convex (r 00 . 0). This shape should result
from morphological or physiological specialization of the
mycelium into mycelial fans that actively forage and
transport hyphae that do not forage, but require carbon
for maintenance. Increasing amounts of nitrogen re-
quested from the fungus need to be transported from
increasing distances, thus leading to disproportionately
larger amounts of carbon allocated to transport. This
disproportionate increase in nitrogen transport cost would
drive up the cost of every additional unit of nitrogen
requested. Not only does the hypothesis that exchange
functions are convex seem tous theoretically sensible but it
is consistent with the admittedly limited experimental
evidence currently available (Jones et al. 1991).
We also assume that the exchange functions pass
through the origin. Given the complete lack of empirical
data on the subject, this assumption is a reasonable ‘‘null
hypothesis.’’ A negative carbon intercept implies that the
fungus pays the plant carbon in order for the plant to
accept its nitrogen, a highly unlikely scenario. A positive
carbon intercept, on the other hand, would indicate that
the fungus requires a ‘‘minimum payment’’—perhaps
related to its basal metabolic rate—before it relinquishes
any nitrogen. We explore the consequences of convex
exchange functions with positive intercepts elsewhere
(unpublished analysis available from the authors) andfind
that partner coexistence still requires equalization of
marginal costs. In this case, however, the trading
possibility boundary is not concave since it has concave
segments separated by kinks where the right derivative
must have the flatter slope. The kinks correspond to
nitrogen uptake thresholds where the plant is predicted to
scale down or discontinue utilization of low-initial-pay-
ment, high-initial-marginal-cost fungi and switch to using
high-initial-payment, low-initial-marginal-cost fungi.
Extensions
We extend our model to two different situations. First
we consider how the utilization of the mycorrhizal fungi
changes with increasing resource availability to the
plant, such as increasing light availability. Second, we
consider the effect of changing nutrient requirements of
the plant, such as increased nitrogen requirement during
a period of seed maturation or luxury consumption.
When the plant is exposed to higher light (an exogenous
increase from C lowmax to C
high
max ), the trading possibility
boundary shifts up at each point by a constant amount
(Chighmax  C lowmax) but the slope at any NG remains
unchanged (compare Fig. 1d to 1c). As a result, the
point of intersection of the trading possibility boundary
and the stoichiometric ray shifts to the right, indicating
that the plant acquires more nitrogen. If every exchange
function is convex, then in brighter light the plant
utilizes existing trading partners more intensively and
may add new partners. To illustrate, the trading
possibility boundary in Fig. 1c and 1d is derived from
the three exchange functions in Fig. 3. The plant utilizes
F1 and F2 in low light, but all three fungi in high light.
On the other hand, suppose the plant has available not
only convex fungi but also one or more concave fungi.
Then if the various concave exchange functions are
replaced by their lower envelope, the procedure in Fig. 3
can be utilized to derive the trading possibility boun-
dary. Since this ‘‘pseudo exchange function’’ (the lower
envelope) has a decreasing marginal-cost curve, addi-
tional nitrogen is obtained in brighter light by lowering
the common marginal cost, relying less intensively on
each of the convex fungi (possibly dumping some) and
relying more intensively on one concave fungus (which-
ever one is activated in the chosen segment of the
envelope).
An increase in the plant’s nitrogen requirement,
relative to its carbon requirement would lead to a
decrease in the slope of the stoichiometric ray h, which
would in turn lead to a shift of to the right of the point
of intersection of that ray with the trading possibility
boundary. The changes to the fungal utilization result-
ing from this increase in nitrogen demand are analogous
to the case of increased light.
Generalizations
To generalize our model, we relax three of its
assumptions. First we relax the assumption that the
active mutualist’s growth requires combining both
resources in a specific ratio. While appropriate for the
mycorrhizal mutualism, this assumption may be inap-
propriate in applications to other mutualisms. Instead, it
may be more plausible to assume that growth increases if
the active mutualist secures more of one factor and no
less of the other factor (regardless of their ratio). Given
any new ‘‘objective function’’ of this form the best choice
for each active mutualist would continue to occur on the
boundary of the trading possibility boundary, and thus
our predictions that an active host mutualist equates
marginal costs among its trading partners continues to
hold as does the prediction that every available mutualist
avoided as a trading partner has a higher initial marginal
cost. For a more general discussion of why some
qualitative properties persist in optimization models of
this kind when the objective function is altered, see
Salant et al. (1995). The remainder of our qualitative
predictions continue to hold if and only if the plant
responds to an increase in nitrogen demand by increasing
its aggregate acquisition of nitrogen. A condition on the
growth function sufficient for this is that nitrogen is what
economists term a ‘‘normal good’’ (Varian 1992).
Growth functions which do not satisfy this condition
are unusual.
Second, we relax the assumption that the nitrogen
acquired and carbon retained were used only to max-
imize the growth of the active mutualist. In a biologically
more realistic case, some carbon and nitrogen may be
used for defense or reproduction or stored for these uses
in the future. However, as long as fitness is increasing
with increasing availability of carbon and nitrogen, a
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fitness-maximizing plant will still choose some point on
the boundary of the trading possibility boundary and
our most basic prediction—equalization of marginal
cost—will continue to hold (Salant et al. 1995).
Third, we relax the assumption that the mutualistic
partners (represented in our model by the mycorrhizal
fungi) do not interact with each other. The assumption
of noninteracting fungi may not be biologically realistic
because fungi can interact with one another in the soil
(Wu et al. 1999) and can possibly exclude one another
from the proximity of a potential plant host. It is also
possible that fungi may choose to colonize some plants
and not others because the fungi themselves can control
some physiological and developmental aspects of
colonization (Smith and Read 1997).
These mechanisms could impact our model in two
ways. Fungal–fungal interactions and the fungal choice
of which plant to colonize could restrict the pool of
fungi available to the plant. In this case, the plant should
still utilize the fungal community with which it is
presented in order to maximize its fitness. Accordingly,
the plant should still obtain nitrogen from the available
fungi to the point where marginal costs are equalized.
Therefore, in this more complex situation, our model
can still be used to predict the extent of the utilization of
each fungus, taking the fungal availability as given.
However, our predictions about fungal composition
would have to take careful account of which exchange
functions are in fact available for the plant to utilize.
It is also possible that the fungus–fungus interactions
may alter the nutrient uptake and transfer capabilities of
the fungi and thus the fungal interactions may alter the
exchange functions associated with the fungi. A thor-
ough analysis of this case is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, the analysis would have two parts: (1)
the endogenous determination of the exchange functions
of potential trading partners and (2) the utilization of
these partners by the plant. While the first part would
require additional analysis, our analysis does illuminate
the second part: given the endogenously determined
exchange functions, a fitness-maximizing plant should
still equate marginal cost of trading with its fungal
partners.
DISCUSSION
We have shown that partner choice, via differential
partner utilization, can lead to coexistence of several
mutualistic partners on a single host if the host can
trade with the partners on terms of equal marginal cost,
and if the sum of the slopes of the marginal cost
functions is not negative. These conditions do not hold
for partners that have linear or concave exchange
functions, and thus the host is predicted to select a
single best partner at each level of resource demand. The
identity of the selected fungus is predicted to change
with changing resource demand of the host. On the
other hand, if the partner mutualists have convex
exchange functions, which is a biologically plausible
proposition, then the two conditions for coexistence do
hold, and the host is predicted to associate with one or
several partner mutualists. Furthermore, our model
predicts the degree of utilization of each partner.
Because the degree of partner utilization could in
principle be converted to partner abundance, differ-
ential partner utilization can determine community
structure of the mutualistic partners. The degree of
utilization of mutualistic partners, and thus the compo-
sition of the partner community, is predicted to change
with changes in resource availability to the host
mutualist. With increasing availability of the resource
controlled by the host mutualist (i.e., increasing light
availability leading to increasing carbon availability for
a plant) the host mutualist should intensify its use of
previously utilized partners and may begin to utilize less
effective partners.
The biological feasibility of our model rests on two
major assumptions. First, the mutualism must be based
on a mutually beneficial exchange of resources or
services; i.e., an increase of payment by resource 1
should result in some predictable increase of supply of
resource 2. Recent work of Kytoviita (2005) clearly
demonstrated that this is the case for the exchange of C
and N between birch seedlings and an ectomycorrhizal
fungus Paxillus involutus. Kytoviita (2005) defoliated
seedlings of birch mycorrhizal with P. involutus and
measured the C and N exchange during three days
immediately following the defoliation. The defoliated
seedlings transferred significantly less C to the fungus
and received significantly less N from the fungus than
nondefoliated controls. Additionally, Kytoviita (2005)
reported a strong positive correlation between the
amount of C transferred from the plant to the fungus
and the amount of N transferred from the fungus to the
plant.
Second, the host mutualist has to be capable of
optimizing the partner utilization, and optimization of
partner utilization has to be advantageous to the host.
We are not aware of any direct empirical evidence that
would confirm or disconfirm this assumption. However,
this assumption is consistent with widely observed
patterns of apparently adaptive phenotypic plasticity
of plants (reviewed by Callaway et al. 2003), such as
optimization of root:shoot ratio with respect to nutrient
and light availability, altering shoot and root architec-
ture in response to resource availability and presence or
absence of neighboring plants.
Our model’s predictions of partner coexistence on a
single host, and change in partner composition with
changing resource availability to the host are consistent
with broad patterns of partner coexistence, and shifts in
partner composition found in the field (Stanton 2003).
However, the extent to which these patterns are caused
by economic as opposed to ecological mechanisms (such
as resource competition) remains unclear.
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Empirical testing of our model
The predictions of our model are directly testable,
and tests are currently under way in our laboratory.
When several fungal trading partners are used simulta-
neously, a plant in isolation should acquire just enough
nitrogen from each partner to equalize marginal cost.
This prediction would persist even if the plant used the
N and C for some other objective besides growth.
Testing this prediction is important because—if we find
empirically that marginal costs are not equated—an
entire class of models (including ours) must be
discarded.
Empirical testing of this prediction involves simulta-
neous measurement of marginal cost in single-plant–
two-fungi microcosms where roots of a single plant are
split between two fungal compartments. The measure-
ment of the marginal cost of obtaining nitrogen from
source f is based on experimentally elevating the plant’s
demand for nitrogen by a small but measurable incre-
ment and measuring the difference in carbon payment
by the plant to source f and the difference in nitrogen
acquisition from source f between a control condition
and an increased nitrogen-demand condition. The
formula for determining marginal cost for each fungus is
MCf ¼ Cf ;increased light  Cf ;control
Nf ;increased light  Nf ;control :
Nitrogen demand of a plant can be increased by
elevating light availability to a light-limited plant. To
test the prediction of equal marginal cost, we have to
measure the marginal costs of two fungi simultaneously
attached to a single plant. This can be done using a split-
root design and stable tracer isotopes.
Measurement of the N and C exchange under several
levels of altered N demand would also provide valuable
information about the curvature of the exchange
functions. If the plant is trading with two fungi, an
increase in the light level will reduce the common
marginal cost if one fungus has a concave exchange
function but will increase the common marginal cost if
both fungi are convex.
Comparison with existing theory
Our focus on the plant’s use of multiple trading
partners distinguishes our work from prior economics-
based theory in mycorrhizal ecology (Koide and Elliot
1989, Tinker et al. 1994, Toumi et al. 2001). Schwartz
and Hoeksema (1998) also focus on a single plant and
fungus; however, since they reinterpret the standard
theory of international trade, the generalization of their
analysis to multiple fungi has already been worked out
in the trade literature. Their predictions differ from ours
because of a difference in our assumptions.
In our model, a plant may acquire nitrogen from one
fungus at one price (defined as carbon paid per unit of
nitrogen acquired) and another fungus at a different
price. In contrast, Hoeksema and Schwartz assume that
the price of the nutrient is the same no matter how much
is exchanged and by which trading partners (in
economics, the so-called ‘‘law of one price’’ assumption).
This is reflected in Schwartz’s and Hoeksema’s linear
‘‘trade acquisition isocline’’ with endogenous common
slope T. If their assumption is valid, then every exchange
would take place at the same price; so if the plant draws
twice as much nutrient from one fungus as from
another, it must pay twice as much carbon. In contrast,
our model predicts that the price (carbon paid per unit
nitrogen received) should vary among the trading
partners while the marginal cost of acquiring nitrogen
should remain equal among trading partners. This
difference between the two models is directly testable
by measuring the price of nitrogen in a one-plant–two-
fungi microcosm.
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